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Close examination of Deuteronomy 24:1-4 sheds light on 
an important social issue in today's culture. 
 
By Richard Davidson 
 
        The wide range of Old Testament passages related to the 
issues of divorce and remarriage includes at least six Hebrew 
expressions referring to divorce that occur altogether some 27 
times, plus several references to remarriage. This article will limit 
itself to the most seminal passage dealing with divorce and 
remarriage, Deuteronomy 24:1-4. It contains far-reaching 
implications for understanding New Testament passages on the 
subject and for properly recognizing the interpretive relationship 
between Old Testament and New Testament divorce/remarriage 
legislation. 
        Crucial grammatical, syntactical, and intertextual features of 
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the legislation have been largely overlooked in previous studies of 
the passage. Yet these features provide keys for understanding 
the continuity between the Testaments with regard to the subject 
of marriage and divorce. 
  
Historical Background and Literary Context  
        The Book of Deuteronomy encompasses Moses’ farewell 
sermon to Israel, given about 1410 B.C. on the borders of 
Canaan just before Moses’ death and Israel’s entrance into the 
Promised Land. The address is framed in the overall structure of a 
covenant renewal. It follows the essential outline of the interna-
tional suzerainty-vassal treaties of the day. 
        Within this overall structure, Deuteronomy 24 is situated as 
part of the specific stipulations of the covenant, Deuteronomy 
12–26. This whole body of material is arranged as an expansion 
and application of the Decalogue of Deuteronomy 5, with the 
various laws grouped within topical units that follow the content 
and sequence of the corresponding commandments of the 
Decalogue.1 
        What is particularly noteworthy for our study at this point is 
that Deuteronomy 24:1-4 is not placed in the section of the 
Deuteronomic law dealing with adultery, but in the section 
dealing with theft. This fact must be kept in mind in seeking to 
understand the underlying purpose of the legislation. 
  
Translation 
        Deuteronomy 24:1-4 reads as follows: “‘[1]When a man 
takes a wife and marries her, if then she finds no favor in his 
eyes because he has found some indecency in her, and he writes 
her a bill of divorce and puts it in her hand and sends her out of 
his house, and she departs out of his house, [2] and if she goes 
and becomes another man's wife, [3] and the latter husband 
dislikes her and writes her a bill of divorce and puts it in her hand 
2
Perspective Digest, Vol. 16 [2011], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/pd/vol16/iss4/1
Page 3 of 25 
 
and sends her out of his house, or if the latter husband dies, who 
took her to be his wife, [4] then her former husband, who sent 
her away, may not take her again to be his wife, after she has 
been defiled; for that is an abomination before the Lord, and you 
shall not bring guilt upon the land which the Lord your God gives 
you for an inheritance’” (RSV, verses marked). 
  
Literary Form and Structure  
        Some earlier English translations of this passage (e.g., KJV, 
ERV, and ASV) are misleading, because they have the actual 
legislative portion beginning already with verse 1: “Then let him 
write her a bill of divorcement” (KJV). If such were the correct 
translation, then God indeed would be sanctioning divorce in this 
passage. But it is now universally recognized that the form or 
genre of this law and the details of Hebrew grammatical structure 
lead to a different understanding. 
        In the legal portions of the Pentateuch, there are two major 
literary types of laws: demonstrable laws and case laws. In the 
former, there is an absolute command or prohibition: “Thou shalt 
. . .” or “Thou shalt not . . .” In the latter, the case laws, there is 
first the description of condition(s), usually beginning with 
Hebrew words best translated as “If . . .” or “When . . .” This is 
followed by the actual legislation, best signaled in English transla-
tion by the word “then . . .” Following the description of 
condition(s), a case law (as well as demonstrable law) sometimes 
has one or more motive clauses giving the rationale for the law. 
        Deuteronomy 24:1-4 is a case law that has all three 
elements just described. In verses 1-3 there are several 
conditions: the grounds and procedure for divorce (vs. 1), the 
remarriage of the woman (vs. 2), and the divorce or the death of 
the second husband (vs. 3). Only after describing all of these 
conditions in verses 1-3 does verse 4 include the Hebrew word for 
“not,” signaling the start of the actual legislation. The only 
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legislation in this passage is in verse 4a, forbidding the woman’s 
former husband to take her back to be his wife under the 
circumstances described in verses 1-3. 
        The implication is clear: God is in no wise legislating or even 
sanctioning divorce in this passage. In fact, the whole passage 
may be expressing tacit disapproval, although the divorce is 
tolerated and not punished. This will become more evident in 
further detail. 
        Following the conditions and the legislation of Deuteronomy 
24:1-4a is the third major part of the case law, the motive 
clauses of verse 4b, containing the multiple rationale for the 
prohibition: The woman has been “defiled,” it would be an 
“abomination” before the Lord, and “sin” should not be brought 
upon the land. These all call for attention in order to understand 
the purpose of the legislation. 
        
Circumstances of Divorce/Remarriage 
        Grounds for Divorce (vs. 1a). Deuteronomy 24:1 describes 
two conditions that lead the husband to “send away” or divorce 
his wife. First, “‘It happens that she finds no favor [“approval” or 
“affection”] in his eyes.’”2 The phrase “to find” or “not to find 
favor in one’s eyes” is the ordinary Hebrew expression for 
“like/dislike” or “please/displease.” It describes the subjective 
situation—the husband’s dislike, displeasure, or lack of 
approval/affection for his wife. 
        But the grounds for divorce are not limited to the subjective 
element. There are also concrete grounds for the disapproval: 
“‘Because he has found some indecency in her’” (NASB). The 
Hebrew word may be translated literally as “nakedness of a 
thing.” But to what does it refer? This question has been widely 
debated among scholars, both ancient and modern. The correct 
interpretation of this Hebrew phrase was at the heart of the 
Pharisees’ test question to Jesus in Matthew 19:3: “‘Is it lawful 
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for a man to divorce his wife for just any reason?’” (NKJV). In 
Jesus’ day, two interpretations of Deuteronomy 24:1 vied for 
attention. The School of Shammai emphasized the word for 
“nakedness,” and interpreted the phrase to refer to marital 
unchastity, while the School of Hillel emphasized the word for 
“thing,” and interpreted the phrase to refer to any indecency or 
anything displeasing to the husband, even for such things as 
serving poor food in a meal. 
        The word for “nakedness” elsewhere in the Old Testament 
most often refers to the nakedness of a person’s private parts or 
genitals, which should not be uncovered or exposed to be seen by 
those who should not see them; and the uncovering of one’s 
nakedness usually has sexual connotations (Gen. 9:22, 23; Ex. 
20:23; 28:42). The word can mean “word [speech, saying]” or 
“thing [matter, affair],” and in the context of Deuteronomy 24:1 
surely means “thing”or “matter.” 
        This phrase occurs only once in the Old Testament besides 
Deuteronomy 24:1, and that is in the previous chapter, 23:15 
(Eng. vs. 14). Here it clearly refers to the excrement mentioned 
in the previous verse that should be covered so that the Lord 
“‘may see no unclean thing among you, and turn away from you’” 
(vs. 13). The “nakedness of a thing” is something that is 
uncovered that should have been covered, something that is 
repulsive, disgusting, or shameful when left exposed. 
        It appears that this phrase in Deuteronomy 24:1 has a 
similar meaning as in the preceding chapter, but refers to the 
“nakedness of a thing” with regard to a wife. It seems probable, 
given the preceding context, and the usual sexual overtones of 
the term when referring to a woman, that the phrase in 
Deuteronomy 24:1 describes a situation of indecent exposure (of 
private parts) on the part of the woman. Theoretically, the phrase 
could probably include illicit sexual intercourse (i.e., adultery), in 
parallel with the phrase “uncover nakedness,” describing such 
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behavior in Leviticus 18 and 20. 
        However, since adultery (and other illicit sexual intercourse) 
received the death penalty (or being “cut off” from the 
congregation) according to the law (Deut. 22:22; Lev. 20:10-18), 
the indecent exposure referred to in Deuteronomy 24:1 must be 
something short of these sexual activities, but a serious sexual 
indiscretion nonetheless. The phrase in Deuteronomy 24:1 
describes some type of serious, shameful, and disgraceful 
conduct of indecent exposure probably associated with sexual 
activity, but less than actual illicit sexual intercourse. 
        What is the implication of this conclusion about the meaning 
of “shameful uncovering” in Deuteronomy 24 for the answer that 
Jesus gives to the Pharisees in Matthew 19 regarding the grounds 
for divorce? Jesus states only one legitimate ground for divorce: 
porneia (vs. 9; 5:32). To what does this word refer when used 
without any qualifiers in the context? Its parallel usage (again 
without qualifiers) in Acts 15, and the intertextual allusions to 
Leviticus 17 and 18 in this latter passage, provide helpful 
guidance here. 
        Acts 15 lists four prohibitions for Gentile Christians given by 
the Jerusalem Council: “That you abstain from things offered to 
idols, from blood, from things strangled, and from sexual 
immorality [pornea]” (vs. 29, NKJV). Particularly striking is that 
this is the same list, in the same order, as the four major legal 
prohibitions explicitly stated to be applicable to the stranger/alien 
as well as to native Israelites in Leviticus 17 and 18. In these Old 
Testament chapters we find (1) sacrificing to demons/idols (Lev. 
17:7-9); (2) eating blood (vss. 10-12); (3) eating anything that 
has not been immediately drained of its blood (vss. 13-16); and 
(4) various illicit sexual practices (Leviticus 18). 
        In this clear case of intertextuality, the Jerusalem Council 
undoubtedly concluded that the practices forbidden to the alien in 
Leviticus 17 and 18 were what should be prohibited to Gentile 
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Christians in the church. The parallel of the fourth prohibition in 
each passage is unambiguous: what Acts 15 labels porneia are 
those illicit sexual activities included in Leviticus 18. These 
activities may be summarized in general as illicit sexual 
intercourse—including incest, adultery, homosexual practices, and 
bestiality. The correlation between Acts 15 and Leviticus 17 and 
18 seems to provide a solid foundation for determining what the 
early church understood by the term porneia. 
        This inner-biblical definition of porneia seems to be decisive 
in understanding Jesus’ “exception clause” regarding divorce on 
grounds of porneia in Matthew 5:32; 19:9. Jesus’ “exception 
clause” is stricter than the grounds for divorce presented in 
Deuteronomy 24:1 (according to the interpretation of both the 
House of Shammai and the House of Hillel). Jesus’ “exception” for 
divorce is porneia, which is not the exact equivalent of the 
“shameful uncovering” of Deuteronomy 24:1. Porneia is a much 
narrower term, referring exclusively to illicit sexual intercourse, 
which in the Mosaic law called for the offender being “cut off” 
from God’s people (Lev. 18:29). As Roy Gane summarizes: “Jesus 
says that whereas Moses allowed for divorce for indecent 
exposure without illicit sexual relations, He permits divorce only if 
illicit sexual relations take place.”3 
        Furthermore, in this light, Jesus’ “exception clause” in 
Matthew 5 and 19 does not contradict the Synoptic parallel 
accounts in Mark and Luke, which contain no exception clause. 
Mark and Luke do not mention any exception clause presumably 
because they do not consider the case of porneia, the penalty for 
which was being “cut off” or death. It was assumed that the 
death penalty or being “cut off” from the congregation meant a 
de facto dissolution of the marriage. Matthew apparently 
preserves the original intent of Jesus for readers after 30 A.D., 
when the death penalty for adultery was abolished. 
        R. H. Charles writes: “When we recognise that Mark’s 
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narrative takes no cognisance of the case of adultery, but only of 
the other and inadequate grounds advanced for divorce, the chief 
apparent contradictions between Matthew and Mark cease to 
exist. What is implicit in Mark is made explicit in Matthew. Both 
gospels therefore teach that marriage is indissoluble for all 
offences short of adultery. . . . Now, it was impossible to 
misinterpret the plain words of Christ, as stated in Mark, at the 
time they were uttered, and so long as the law relating to the 
infliction of death on the adulteress and her paramour was not 
abrogated. But, as we know, this law was abrogated a few years 
later. The natural result was that to our Lord’s words, which had 
one meaning before the abrogation of this law, a different 
meaning was in many quarters attached after its abrogation, and 
they came to be regarded as forbidding divorce under all 
circumstances, though really and originally they referred only to 
divorces procured on inadequate grounds “that is, grounds not 
involving adultery.”4 
        Procedure of Divorce. According to Deuteronomy 24:1b, 
there were three major elements in the divorce proceedings. 
First, the husband wrote a “certificate of divorce,” literally 
“document of cutting off.” Other legal documents are mentioned 
in the Old Testament, and the certificate of divorce is also alluded 
to in other passages. Although there is no Old Testament 
example of the actual wording of such a document, it has been 
suggested that the central divorce formula is contained in 
Yahweh’s statement of divorce proceedings against Israel in 
Hosea 2:2: “‘she is not My wife, nor am I her Husband!’” Such a 
statement would mean the legal breaking of the marriage 
covenant as much as the death of the marriage partner. The 
document no doubt had to be properly issued and officially 
authenticated, thus ensuring that the divorce proceedings were 
not done precipitously. 
        The bill of divorce may have also contained what in Rabbinic 
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times was considered “the essential formula in the bill of divorce,” 
i.e., “Lo, thou art free to marry any man.”5 This would provide for 
the freedom and right of the woman to be married again. The 
document would be indicating that although the woman had been 
guilty of some kind of indecent exposure, she was not guilty of 
adultery or other illicit sexual intercourse, and therefore not liable 
to punishment for such sexual activity. Thus she was protected 
from abuse or false charges by her former husband or others at a 
subsequent time. 
        Parallels from the Code of Hammurabi and the Jewish 
Mishnah indicate that the certificate of divorce would also contain 
mention of the financial settlement, unless the woman was guilty 
of misconduct, in which case no financial compensation was 
awarded her. Probably the latter (no financial compensation) was 
the case in Deuteronomy 24:1. 
        The second step of the divorce proceedings was to put “‘it 
[the bill of divorce] in her [the wife’s] hand’” (Deut. 24:1). She 
must actually receive notice of the divorce directly in order for it 
to be effective. The Mishnah tractate Gittim deals with various 
kinds of possible situations that might not qualify as actually 
putting the divorce certificate in the hand of the woman. The 
effect, again, is the protection of the wife by ensuring that she 
has access to, and concrete notification of, the divorce document. 
        The third step is that the husband “‘sends her out of his 
house’” (vs. 1). The Hebrew word for “send” is elsewhere in the 
Old Testament the closest one to a technical term for divorce. 
Sending the wife away is intended to effectuate the divorce 
process. The break is final and complete. 
        Remarriage and the second divorce or death of second 
husband. The third condition specified in Deuteronomy 24:1-3 is 
that the divorced woman remarries, and then her second 
husband either divorces her or dies. 
        Raymond Westbrook seeks to establish that the grounds for 
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the second divorce are not the same as those for the first divorce. 
The second husband is said to “detest” or “dislike” or “hate” her, 
which term is not employed in the grounds for the first divorce.6 
The evidence Westbrook cites, however, actually militates against 
his conclusion, for he shows that in ancient Near Eastern sources 
and later Jewish material the formula “I hate my husband/wife” is 
a summary of the longer standard divorce formula “I hate and 
divorce my husband/wife.” Westbrook’s argument that 
“hate/dislike” in Deuteronomy 24:3 refers to divorce without 
objective grounds in contrast to divorce with objective grounds in 
verse 1, while plausible, is not persuasive. In light of the fact that 
this technical term is used elsewhere to summarize the grounds 
for divorce, whatever they might be, it seems preferable to take 
hate/dislike as summarizing the same situation as the first 
divorce mentioned in verse 1. 
        The divorce procedure is the same as described in verse 1: 
The husband writes his wife a certificate of divorce, puts it in her 
hand, and sends her away out of his house. Or, as an alternative 
situation, the second husband dies. 
  
Legislation  
        After the lengthy statement of conditions, the legislation 
itself is short and simple: “‘then her former husband who 
divorced her must not take her back to be his wife after she has 
been defiled’” (Deut. 24:4). Though the legislation is clear, the 
rationale for this legislation is far less certain. Already in the 
legislation, however, one part of the rationale is given: “‘after she 
has been defiled.’” Two additional aspects of the rationale for the 
prohibition appear in the motive clauses. 
  
Rationale for the Legislation: The Motive Clauses  
        The explanation: “‘After she has been defiled.’” The first 
indicator of the reason for this legislation comes in the 
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explanation why the first husband is not permitted to remarry: 
“‘she has been defiled’” (vs. 4). The Hebrew for this clause is 
translated “to be or become unclean or defiled.” But the 
grammatical form employed in this verse is very unusual in the 
Hebrew Bible, used nowhere else in this way and only a very few 
times with a very few verbs. This form is passive, and it normally 
conveys the reflexive idea (“she defiled herself”). Deuteronomy 
24:4 would probably best be translated as “she has been 
made/caused to defile herself.” 
        This leads clearly to Leviticus 18, where we have not only 
the reflexive form of this word (vss. 24, 30), but the other two 
terms/concepts used in the motive clauses of Deuteronomy 24:4: 
the term abomination (vss. 22, 26, 29) and the idea of bringing 
defilement/sin upon the land (vss. 25, 27, 28). Leviticus 18 is the 
only other chapter of the Hebrew Bible that combines these three 
terms/ideas in one context, and seems undoubtedly to be alluded 
to by Deuteronomy 24:4. It is crucial to note that in Leviticus 18 
one defiles oneself by having illicit sexual relations with another 
(vss. 20, 24, including at least adultery, bestiality, homosexual 
practice). Deuteronomy 24:4 also probably alludes to Numbers 
5:13, 14, 20, where the wife is specifically referred to as having 
“defiled herself” by having illicit sexual relationships with a man 
other than her husband. 
        The implication of this connection between Deuteronomy 
24:4, Leviticus 18, and Numbers 5 is that the sexual activity of 
the divorced woman with the second husband is tantamount to 
adultery or some other illicit sexual intercourse, even though she 
does not incur the death penalty or other punishment as in the 
cases of Leviticus 18. 
        Various commentators have recognized this implication. 
“The second marriage of a divorced woman was placed implicitly 
upon a par with adultery.”7 S. R. Driver concurs that “the union of 
a divorced woman with another man, from the point of view of 
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her first husband, [is] falling into the same category as 
adultery.”8 
        If the sexual intercourse of the woman with her second 
husband defiles her and is tantamount to adultery, why is she 
free from punishment? The answer seems to be found in the 
meaning of “has been caused to defile herself.” This apparently 
does not refer to the one she has had sexual intercourse with 
(i.e., her second husband) as the “cause” of defilement. By 
utilizing the passive reflexive form, another cause than the 
immediate defilement with her second husband seems to be 
implied. This is highlighted by comparing this occurrence with its 
other occurrences in the Hebrew Bible, where the same dynamic 
is functioning: The ultimate cause, seemingly implicit in this rare 
grammatical form, is the first husband. The legislation subtly 
implicates the first husband for divorcing his wife. Even though 
his action is not punished, and therefore is tolerated, the law 
makes clear that his action does not have divine approval. His 
putting away his wife has in effect caused her to defile herself in 
a second marriage in a similar way as if she were committing 
adultery. 
        Thus, while Deuteronomy 24:1-4 does not legislate divorce 
or remarriage, and even tolerates it to take place within certain 
grounds less than illicit sexual intercourse, at the same time 
within the legislation is an internal indicator that such divorce 
brings about a state tantamount to adultery, and therefore is not 
in harmony with the divine will. 
        Recognizing the correct translation of Deuteronomy 24:4 
(“she has been caused to defile herself”) throws light on Jesus’ 
words in Matthew 5:32: “‘I say to you that whoever divorces his 
wife for any reason except sexual immorality [porneia] causes 
her to commit adultery [presumably when she remarries]; and 
whoever marries a woman who is divorced commits adultery.’” 
Just as in the other “‘I say unto you’” sayings of Matthew 5, Jesus 
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is not changing or adding something new to the Law, but showing 
the true and deeper meaning that is already contained in the 
Law, which had been distorted by later misinterpretation. Already 
in Deuteronomy 24:4 it is indicated that breaking the marriage 
bond on grounds less than illicit sexual intercourse causes the 
woman to defile herself, i.e., commit what is tantamount to 
adultery. 
        A further implication of this interpretation of Deuteronomy 
24:4 is that Jesus, in pointing the Pharisees away from the divine 
“concession” in verses 1-4 to God’s ideal “‘from the beginning’” 
(Matt. 19:8), was not arbitrarily shifting from the Deuteronomic 
law to the Edenic ideal. He was rather pointing to a conclusion 
that was already implicit in Deuteronomy 24:4: Verses 1-3 were 
a temporary concession to “hardness” of Israel’s heart, but they 
did not represent God’s divine ideal for marriage. 
        The reason: “‘It is an abomination.’” As already noted, the 
term abomination, occurring in context with the other two 
rationales found in verse 4, links unmistakably with Leviticus 18. 
As the various types of illicit sexual intercourse mentioned in 
Leviticus 18 are “‘abominations,’” so is a woman’s returning to 
the first husband after having been married again. If the woman’s 
remarriage after her first divorce is similar to adultery, 
remarriage to her former husband is even more so. P. C. Craigie 
writes, “If the woman were then to remarry her first husband, 
after divorcing the second, the analogy with adultery would 
become even more complete; the woman lives first with one 
man, then another, and finally returns to the first.”9 
        Furthermore, it appears that the prohibition does in effect 
bring indirect punishment on the first husband for divorcing his 
wife. Even though his divorcing her is not directly censured, yet 
since she “has been caused [by him] to defile herself” through his 
action, he is indirectly punished by not being allowed to take her 
as a wife again. To do such would be an “‘abomination.’” Though 
13
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the punishment for failing to follow this prohibition is not given in 
the text, it probably may be assumed that such an abomination 
would not just be similar to adultery, but treated as adultery and 
punished accordingly. 
        The command: “‘You shall not bring sin on the land.’” This 
last motive clause once again relates to Leviticus 18. The idea 
that illicit sexual intercourse defiles the land is mentioned three 
times in this chapter (vss. 25, 27, 28). Because the land is 
defiled, God says that “‘therefore I visit the punishment of its 
iniquity upon it, and the land vomits out its inhabitants’” (vs. 25). 
        This same concept is what is found in Deuteronomy 24:4, 
even though the noun iniquity is replaced with the verbal idea of 
“sin” being brought on the land. The verb “‘sin’” (“miss a mark,” 
“go astray”) may have been substituted to imply a somewhat less 
serious infraction than the “‘iniquity’” [“crooked behavior,” “per-
version”] of Leviticus 18, but it also may here have been 
considered virtually synonymous. 
        A man is not to remarry his wife when she has been married 
again to someone else for the same reason that Israel is not to 
engage in other illicit sexual intercourse. As we have already 
seen, to commit this abomination defiles the land and will 
eventually lead to divine punishment as He causes the land to 
vomit out its inhabitants. 
        An important implication of this motive clause for the 
contemporary relevance of this legislation arises from the direct 
linkage of Deuteronomy 24:4 with Leviticus 18 in the defiling of 
the land by the iniquity/sin of the sexual abominations. The 
“‘abominations’” mentioned in Leviticus 18 (and reiterated in 
Leviticus 20) are forbidden not only for the native Israelite but 
also explicitly for the non-Israelite “stranger” or “alien” who 
sojourns among the children of Israel. Furthermore, these 
abominations caused the non-Israelite heathen who inhabited 
Canaan before Israel to be vomited out when they committed 
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these acts. Therefore the “‘abomination’” and defiling quality of 
these acts clearly are not simply ritual in nature, applying only to 
Israel, but timeless and universal, applying to anyone who 
practices them. Since Deuteronomy 24:4 is placed in the same 
category as the practices of Leviticus 18, it may be assumed that 
the prohibition against marrying a former wife who has been 
married again is universal and of contemporary relevance in its 
application. Disregarding such prohibition will not only bring 
defilement and sin upon the land of Israel which God was giving 
to them as an inheritance, but will also defile any land where 
such practice is carried out. 
  
Overall Purpose of the Legislation  
        Various suggestions. There have been many suggestions as 
to the overall purpose of the legislation in Deuteronomy 24:1-4. 
Some eight major views may be categorized and summarized:10 
        1. To ensure the proper legal procedure of divorce. This 
assumes the translation of the KJV and other versions that place 
the condition in verse 1. 
        The view is based upon a misunderstanding of the structure 
of the passage. Deuteronomy 24:1-4 neither legislates divorce 
nor sanctions it. The actual legislation deals only with the 
prohibition of remarriage to the first husband after an intervening 
marriage. In fairness to this view, however, it must be said that 
the very mention of the certain conditions in the divorce 
proceedings does at least indicate that these conditions would 
have to be met in order for the legislation to apply. In the very 
toleration of divorce under these conditions, some tacit 
recognition of a set procedure for divorce is made in the passage. 
        2. To discourage easy divorce. As Jay Adams puts it: “The 
whole point of the four 
verses in question is to forestall hasty action by making it 
impossible to rectify the situation when divorce and remarriage to 
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another takes place.”11 
        This view has more to commend it. The mention of specific 
divorce proceedings in the legislation would have some tacit 
influence to this effect, but the actual legislation would have 
further underscored this point. When a divorce was contemplated 
by the first husband, he must reckon with the fact that such 
action would be final once his wife had remarried. He could never 
change his mind and try to woo her back. But Westbrook points 
out a weakness in this being the only purpose for the legislation: 
“the divorcing husband is hardly likely to have in mind the 
possible circumstances following the dissolution of a subsequent 
marriage by his wife.”12 
        3. To inhibit remarriage. Craigie argues that the text treats 
subsequent remarriages as defilements similar to adultery. He 
regards the grounds for the divorce as possibly just some type of 
“physical deficiency in the woman.” The legislation restricts 
current divorce practices so that it does not become simply a 
“‘legal’ form of committing adultery.”13 
        The third view contains elements that find support in the 
text. Craigie is correct to argue that the remarriage of the woman 
(after a divorce on lesser grounds than extramarital sexual 
intercourse) is presented as tantamount to adultery in that she 
“defiles herself” (although she is not punished). He is also on the 
right track in seeing the legislation as curbing the excesses of 
divorce so that it becomes “legalized adultery.” But Craigie 
broadens the meaning far too much when he sees it probably 
referring to a “physical deficiency” in the woman and not 
“indecent exposure.” He also misses the implication that it is the 
first husband who is ultimately culpable for having caused his 
wife to defile herself by the second marriage relationship. 
        4. To protect the second marriage. Reuven Yaron suggests 
that the legislation inhibits the social tensions that might arise 
from a “lovers’ triangle.”14 
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        This view also has merit. If the divorced wife who has 
married again knows that she cannot get back together with her 
first husband, she would certainly be discouraged from planning 
any intrigue against her second husband so he would divorce her. 
The first husband would likewise be prevented from trying to get 
his first wife back. Although these aspects seem to be part of 
what the law accomplished, Laney has correctly pointed out that 
this view “fails to explain why the rule would apply after the 
death of the second husband when the second marriage would no 
longer be in jeopardy.”15 
        5. To prevent a “type of incest.” Gordon Wenham argues 
that marriage creates a kind of indissoluble “kinship bond” 
between husband and wife, and thus after a divorce and 
remarriage to return to the first husband is a kind of incest, which 
is forbidden in Leviticus 18:6-18.16 
        This view does not have the weight of evidence of the text 
and context to support it. As Laney remarks, “The major difficulty 
with this view is that it seems to reach beyond what is clear to 
the reader. One wonders how many Israelites would have seen 
the connection between the ‘one flesh’ of the marriage union and 
the incest laws of Leviticus 18:6-18.”17 Westbrook moves closer 
to the main objection to Wenham’s “type of incest” view, 
asserting that, “his analysis cannot possibly apply to the 
Deuteronomic law because it completely ignores the intervening 
marriage. The law does not, as Wenham assumes, prohibit 
remarriage as such, and there is no way that we can see of the 
second marriage being a factor in the creation of an incestuous 
affinity.”18 The major problem of Wenham’s position, as hinted 
already by Westbrook, is that it is founded on an erroneous view 
of the marriage covenant. Wenham assumes that the “one-flesh” 
relationship in the marriage covenant is absolutely indissoluble, 
even by divorce and remarriage. Such a position is not supported 
in Genesis 1–3 or anywhere else in Scripture. 
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        6. To “protect a stigmatized woman from further abuse by 
her offending first husband.”19 “Deuteronomy deals not with a 
sinning wife but a sinning husband.”20 In his view, the wife’s 
action was not a sexual offense at all but some “embarrassing 
condition,” and the husband was “so hard-hearted that he cast 
the woman from himself” and “so unrepentant that he allowed 
her to be sexually coupled to another man.”21 
        This view has many points that square with our exegesis. 
William Luck is correct that the law implicates the first husband 
as the offending party.22 He states: “the stigma [of ‘defilement’] 
of the woman in Deuteronomy 24:4 does not so stigmatize her 
that the moral guilt hangs about her marriages to men other than 
her former husband. The stigma instead reflects back upon the 
man who caused the problem, that is, her first husband.”23 In 
emphasizing the first husband’s culpability, however, Luck has 
tended to trivialize the grounds for divorce by indicating that 
Deuteronomy 24:1 simply refers to “embarrassing 
circumstances,” instead of “indecent exposure.” 
        7. To recognize the “natural repulsion” or taboo against 
having sexual intercourse with a woman who has cohabited with 
another man. This view has found support in Calum Carmichael, 
who seeks to show evidence that such an attitude did exist in 
ancient Israel.24 
        This view does not stand up to a rigorous scrutiny. 
Westbrook concludes: “We would suggest that, far from there 
being a natural repulsion, both biblical and ancient Near Eastern 
sources find nothing untoward in a man resuming relations with 
his wife after she has had relations with another, even amounting 
to marriage, providing no other factor makes resumption of the 
marriage improper.”25 
        8. To deter greedy profit by the first husband. Raymond 
Westbrook contends that this legislation is about property. In the 
first divorce (vs. 1) since there were moral grounds, the wife 
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received no financial settlement, whereas in the second divorce 
(vs. 3) there were no moral grounds so the wife received financial 
remuneration. The legislation is to keep the first husband from 
profiting twice, once to divorce her (and give her nothing) and 
once to remarry her (and get her financial settlement from her 
second husband). Westbrook notes how this interpretation fits 
nicely with the structural placement of this law in the section of 
Deuteronomic legislation dealing with theft.26 
        This view points in a promising direction, although it 
appears to go beyond the evidence in its specifics. Westbrook’s 
distinction between two kinds of divorce functioning in 
Deuteronomy 24:1-3 finds its basis in a similar distinction in the 
Code of Hammurabi and the Mishnah, but really has no basis in 
the biblical text. As we have already seen, the divorce formula of 
verse 3 is probably an abbreviated version of the same type of 
divorce in verse 1. Westbrook’s view, in addition to being 
speculative, does not appear to take seriously enough the terms 
“abomination” and “sin on the land” (of verse 4). Furthermore, 
this view assumes that the first divorce is perfectly legitimate, 
contrary to what we have seen implied in the clause “she has 
been caused to defile herself.” 
        Aside from the weakness of Westbrook’s proposal in its 
details, he does seek to make sense out of the placement of this 
law within the section of Deuteronomy 12–26 dealing with “theft.” 
If it does not deal with theft in the way that Westbrook suggests, 
Westbrook must be credited with attempting to wrestle with the 
larger issue of the theological context for this legislation. 
        These considerations lead to an understanding of the 
relationship between this legislation and theft in a much larger 
perspective than Westbrook proposes. The law of Deuteronomy 
24:1-4 has prevented men from treating a woman as mere 
chattel, property, to be swapped back and forth at will. Her 
dignity and value as an individual person is upheld in this law, 
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and the first husband who caused her to defile herself is implicitly 
shown to be at fault. The law is aimed, in its final placement 
within the larger context, to protect the woman from being 
robbed of her personhood. 
        This is reinforced by noticing the very next law in this 
section of Deuteronomy (24:5): “‘When a man has taken a new 
wife, he shall not go out to war or be charged with any business; 
he shall be free at home one year, and bring happiness to his 
wife whom he has taken.’” This law clearly indicates that its 
ultimate purpose is to enable the newly wedded man to stay at 
home “‘and bring happiness to his wife.’” The law protects against 
robbing the newly married couple of their intimacy and 
happiness, and especially protects the happiness of the wife. 
        This leads to an understanding of how Deuteronomy 24:1-4 
fits into the progression of thought in the section of laws dealing 
with the eighth commandment or “theft.” As Kaufman pointed out 
with regard to the organization of the various laws within the 
thought units of a given commandment, they “are arranged 
according to observable principles of priority.”27 Kaufman’s 
analysis of the Deuteronomic laws arranged under the eighth 
commandment is insightful. He notes how there are six 
paragraphs in this section (which he labels A through F). The 
structure of the section begins with the theft of property 
(paragraphs A [Deut. 23:20, 21], B [vss. 22-24], and C [vss. 25, 
26]. Then it moves to the theft of “life” in a metaphorical sense 
(paragraphs D [24:1-5] and E [vs. 6]). Finally it deals with the 
theft of the physical (kidnapping, paragraph F [vs. 7]). 
        Kaufman has rightly pointed out how Deuteronomy 24:1-4 
belongs together with verse 5 as one paragraph with a common 
theme: “Perhaps the current position of paragraph D within Word 
VII [the eighth commandment] offers an insight into the 
compiler’s (or author’s) understanding of the very essence of the 
two laws which comprise it. Both, like paragraph E and F that 
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follow, were apparently seen as preventing the theft of nepeç–of 
the services and devotion of a groom to his bride, and of the self-
respect of a divorced woman.”28 
        Therefore Deuteronomy 24:1-4, in its larger canonical 
context, serves to protect the rights of women, to protect their 
dignity and self-respect, especially in circumstances in which they 
may appear powerless. The law, in its self-expressed dis-
approval—although temporary toleration, of inequalities afforded 
women due to the hardness of men’s hearts—points toward the 
day when such inequities will be resolved by a return to the 
Edenic ideal for marriage. 
  
Implications for the 21st Century  
        Although Deuteronomy 24:1-4 tolerated divorce on the 
grounds of indecent exposure on the part of the wife, at the same 
time within the legislation is a rare internal indicator that such a 
divorce does not meet with divine approval. The husband’s 
putting away his wife has in effect caused her to defile herself in 
a second marriage in a similar way as if she were committing 
adultery (although it is not punished as such because the blame 
is placed upon the first husband and not the wife). Thus already 
in verse 4 it is indicated that the breakage of the marriage bond 
on grounds less than illicit sexual intercourse causes the woman 
to defile herself, i.e., commit what is tantamount to adultery 
(when she marries again). 
        The correct translation of verse 4 (“she has been caused to 
defile herself”) seems to illuminate Jesus’ words in Matthew 5:32: 
“‘Whoever divorces his wife for any reason except sexual 
immorality [illicit sexual intercourse] causes her to commit 
adultery [presumably when she remarries].’” Thus Matthew 5:32 
is not an exception to the rule of Jesus’ “But I say unto you” 
statements in Matthew 5. Here, as elsewhere in the chapter, He is 
not changing the Old Testament meaning but recovering its full 
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force from later misinterpretation. 
        The grounds for divorce in Deuteronomy 24:1 lie behind 
Jesus’ discussion with the Pharisees in Matthew 19. The School of 
Shammai interpreted “the nakedness of a thing” to mean 
“indecent exposure [including adultery and other illicit sexual 
intercourse since these did not often meet the death penalty by 
the time of his day]” and the School of Hillel interpreted the 
grounds to be any indecency even as trivial as a wife’s spoiling 
the husband’s food. Jesus’ “exception clause” is stricter than both 
Shammai and Hillel, including only porneia as legitimate grounds 
for divorce. 
        In light of the precise structural and content parallels 
between the prohibitions of Acts 15:29 and Leviticus 17–18, 
porneia in Acts 15 (and presumably also Matt 5:32 and 19:9) 
may be understood as referring to illicit sexual intercourse (as 
detailed in Leviticus 18, including at least incest, adultery, 
homosexual practices, and bestiality). 
        Jesus’ grounds for divorce (porneia) are the equivalent of 
those practices that in the Old Testament met with the death 
penalty or being “cut off.” Therefore it may be stated that Jesus’ 
exception clause in Matthew is not in contradiction to the lack of 
the exception clause in the other Synoptic gospels. Mark and 
Luke do not have the exception clause, presumably because such 
exception was assumed (via the death penalty or being “cut off” 
and thus de facto dissolving of the marriage) in Old Testament 
law. Matthew has the exception clause to preserve the meaning 
of Jesus’ words in a setting in which the death penalty for porneia 
was no longer in effect. 
        The legislative part of Deuteronomy 24:1-4, which 
prohibited a wife to return to her first husband after she had 
subsequently married (and then the second husband had either 
died or divorced her), is linked by crucial terminology and con-
cepts to the permanent and universal legislation of Leviticus 18, 
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and therefore should be considered of contemporary relevance in 
its application today. 
        Deuteronomy 24:1-4, seen in its larger context in the Book 
of Deuteronomy, constitutes legislation to promote and protect 
the rights of women and their dignity and self-respect. In its 
tolerance of, but self-expressed disapproval of, inequities 
afforded women due to the hardness of men’s hearts, this law 
points toward the day when such inequities will be resolved by a 
return to the Edenic pattern for marriage. 
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